

# **Estonians and Russians in Estonia: Is the Soviet Past Still Dominating the Present?**

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Given Estonia's gaining EU membership in 2004 and joining the European single labour market and being within the Schengen treaty space, the assumption of our research was that historical context would hold reduced salience for the two main ethnic groups of Estonia, giving way to perceptions, expressions, and nuances of some more modern, common European identity. Such assumptions are foregrounded by a number of social, economic, and demographic shifts since having joined the EU.

In researching the inter-relationships between Estonians, and Estonian Russians in contemporary Estonia – with particular interest in the contemporary orientation towards, and patterns of identification with, Estonia's past – domains of interest included 'Estonians', 'Russians in Estonia', 'Russians in Russia' and 'Estonian Government'; while themes embraced constructions of the past, including the context of the Soviet Union's role in WW II.


Findings suggest that recent events on the streets of Tallinn (April 2007) appear to be related to the role of the Soviet Union in WW II inter alia, where its construction as 'occupier of Eastern Europe (as opposed to 'liberator') forms a 'core evaluative dimension of identity' for the Estonians, together with the 'Bronze Soldier' having no symbolic salience or relation to the Estonian identity. Findings, such as Estonian Russians expressing much stronger idealistic identification with 'Estonians' than with their own "titular" group, will be used to further demonstrate ISA etic concepts that incorporate emic values and beliefs in contemporary Estonia.

## **1. Introduction: Historical Background**

Estonia became independent from Russia after WW I on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 1918. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany

signed a bilateral treaty in violation of principles of self determination (called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) that apportioned Central and Eastern Europe between the USSR and Germany. Estonia remained in the Soviet sphere of influence. After the annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union, Estonia's migration was no longer a naturally developing process; it was partly forced. Russians and other Soviet immigrants arrived in different "migration waves" from the Russian Federation and other parts of the USSR. Figure 1.1 shows that the most intensive immigration took place during a number of years right after the Second World War. From the mid-sixties the hinterland of migration enlarged, and another reason for immigration became obvious: immigrants looked for material welfare. Continuous industrialization caused an increased demand for extra labour force and that, in turn, caused the second larger immigration wave in the 1960s (Tammur, 2008:12).

**Figure 1.1**  
**Migration in Estonia, 1946–1999 <sup>a</sup> (Tammur, 2008)**



<sup>a</sup> The data for 1946–1955 include only the urban population.

From 1945-1990 the Soviet occupation "succeeded", by sovietization, (founding of heavy industry and importing labour from Soviet Russia) in changing Ida-Virumaa county (the North-East region of Estonia) and Harju county to such a degree that previously Estonian language areas became

Estonian-Russian mixed areas. This “pattern” is noticeable in Tallinn and in the cities of Ida-Virumaa county (Narva, Sillamäe, and Kohtla-Järve) also today. Despite the hardship of the regime and Russification policies implemented under the direction of Moscow, Estonian was used as a language of instruction in primary and secondary schools and in the universities.

## **2. Estonia’s Road to Europe in 1992-2007**

Owing to the weakness of Moscow’s political power and the collapse of the *iron curtain* at the end of the 1980s, Estonia became newly independent in 1991. Estonians had become a ruling majority in their own homeland after 50 years of occupation; the situation of Russian-speakers changed drastically as a result of becoming a minority in a newly independent country which had been for decades a part of the Soviet Union. Many surveys like *Freedom House Ratings 1991-2006* (Tilly, 2008: 47) show that due to the political rights and civil liberties in the modern democratic legal system implemented in Estonia, anxiety that could lead to any kind of violence between Estonians and Russians had not been observed in Estonia since restoration of independence in 1991.


We have to take into account certain important political events which broadly influence societal development together with the developments related to both the Estonians’ and Russians’ situation under the new circumstances. One of the primary factors here is Estonia’s joining the European Union and NATO. From May 1<sup>st</sup> 2004 Estonia has been an EU member, but may we say that due to Estonia’s EU membership the European dimension is now also forming a part of Estonians’ self-perception?

Although being indisputably a part of Europe, Estonia’s position there has not always been conclusively defined. Today there have emerged new tendencies towards identification with Estonia’s welfare-state neighbours, i.e., the aspiration to have similarities with the Nordic countries. “Escape” to the free world was a very dynamic impetus for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. How these young democracies economically used their chance is, for instance, largely different from developments in Russia after dissolution of the USSR. In the main, nostalgia about the socialist period

and the Soviet regime has been minimal in Estonia. It is hard to say the same about Russia.

The Estonian economy has been growing at a rapid pace since 2000 with an average GDP growth of 9% in the period 2000-2007. Employment has increased since 2001. The number of employed persons grew most in 2006 (by 6.4%). The unemployment rate, which was highest in 2000 (13.6% as seen on Fig 2.2), decreased in the following years. In 2007, the unemployment rate dropped to 4.7% (in Northeastern Estonia – to 9 %) (Pettai, 2008: 42).

**Figure 2.1. Unemployment rate for the period 1992–2007**



*Source: Statistics Estonia, News Release No. 18, 14 February 2008.*

### **3. Recent Developments in Relations between Estonians and Estonian Russians**

Despite positive trends expressed by the figure about decreasing unemployment, a new question arises: Will the young Russian-speaking population living in Estonia turn into a multi-cultural ethnic group with a significant Estonian linguistic and cultural background, or will the state-determined identity become a significant value for them?

Professor Sergei Issakov of the University of Tartu has expressed his claim that Estonia has already taken the approach of significant integration. According to his views, an interesting process, the formation of a new ethnic group and a new ethno-cultural community, Estonian Russians, is evidently underway. This is a group with their own subculture similar to the French-speaking population in Canada or Swedish-speaking Finns. He says in one of his writings, "We remain Russians by our language, culture and self-consciousness. But, however, we are still not identical to Russians living in Russia or let's say, to the Russians living in America" (Issakov 2004).

As you see, today, for the first and second generations of Russians in Estonia, integration is a continuous process in which they become closer to Estonian society step by step, simultaneously losing their original cultural heritage (Russia as homeland - heritage).

European enlargement has definitely influenced the self-definition of the Estonian people. Transition gives the opportunity to re-define "Europeanness" from the viewpoint of new European identity components incorporated into the Estonian identity. (Kirch, Tuisk, 2007: 300).

Given Estonia's gaining EU membership in 2004 and joining the European single labour market and being within the Schengen treaty space, the assumption of our research was that historical context would hold reduced salience for the two main ethnic groups of Estonia, giving way to perceptions, expressions and nuances of some more modern, common European identity. Such assumptions are foregrounded by a number of social, economic and demographic shifts since having joined the EU.

The status of European citizen should help to form the identity of Estonian Russians and other ethnic groups, and this identity is very likely to be influenced by European values. One cultural environment will probably not simply be replaced by another, but rather by an essentially wider cultural space. The broader context of the European Union has created a good base for a new generation of Russian young people compared with the former generation (their immigrant parents). Further socialization and integration will depend also on satisfaction with life and solidarity within society that is going to be determined by developments in the economic status of the younger generation.

However, the population of Estonia cannot be treated as a carrier of a new single national identity as yet. A problem might arise in finding the optimal social factors and mechanisms to assure the continuation of inner-state cultural integration (in terms of the formation of a multi-cultural society) and national integration (in terms of citizenship).

It is evident that Estonia's accession to the EU has brought not only reconciliation with the Western economic system and legal culture, but also the adoption of European values, European political culture, etc. An interesting question is – what is or who is a European? Here we try to limit our discussion and think about the Russians' 'Europeanness'. Throughout the long period of its history, Russia has been commuting between two alternatives: trying to follow the European way of reforms on the one side, and looking for an original and different mode of development on the other (Asian) side. Indeed, many Russian people are probably more European than those who live in states aspiring to become new EU member states. Nevertheless, instead of taking a decision based on people's knowledge of the Internet, or traditions of Russian classical music or paintings, one has to look at the traditions of Russian statehood, rule, and power. Traditions of Russian centralised power, hierarchy, and subordination are vital; and the inappropriateness of European traditions in this society is quite obvious.

The European tradition is also to acknowledge factual history. This is the best basis for respectable relations between partners. Especially for the three Baltic States, the Second World War evokes resentment. Russia cannot be a trustworthy neighbour for the Baltic people before it admits the fact of the occupation of the Baltic countries in 1940.

The attempt to understand very recent developments, which have had a strong influence on identity developments for both Estonians and Estonian Russians, also gave the authors a good reason to postulate a hypothesis based on the events that took place in Tallinn in April 2007. Alongside the moving of the historical WW II monument called 'the bronze soldier', there occurred a polarization in the minds of Estonian and Russian people, which expanded to unexpected hooliganism in the centre of Tallinn. Despite the fact that the main "actors" in the streets numbered only around 2,000 Russian-speakers aged 15-25, rioting for two nights only, these events were enough to warrant studying stereotypes and attitudes reflecting the historical

past and the present in order find some explanation of the question of whether the past still dominates the present.

#### **4. Identity Structure Analysis**

A comprehensive research method called Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) was considered applicable for the current study. The method of the ISA covers the authors' need for cross-cultural comparison and in-depth analysis providing the use of cross-cultural universals (e.g. standardised parameters like *contra identification with others*) named *etics* together with *emic* qualities which reflect indigenous psychologies of local cultures. It is evident that ISA *etic* parameters of identity (i.e. indices) require no translation across languages and cultures. As Weinreich underlines: "...investigators have to be keenly aware of the *emic* qualities of the discourses that are incorporated within the *etic* parameters." (Weinreich, 2003a: 79).

We also give definitions of the method and of 'identity' as follows: Identity Structure Analysis (Weinreich, 1980/1986) is an open-ended conceptual framework, which can be used to explore individual or group identities within particular sociocultural and historical contexts. It is thus primarily concerned with the 'individual and societal phenomena' within which issues of identity are implicated. Definition of identity: A person's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future. (Weinreich, 2003: 26).

While applying ISA in this project to study Estonian and Russian students in Estonia and their identity formation using Weinreich's research methodology, we have also noticed that there exist related and competitive theoretical results of Dr Karina V. Korostelina, who studied identity formation in the Crimean peninsula (South Ukraine) in 2003 (Korostelina, 2007: 49-68). Korostelina defines identity as "a system that involves core identities, short-term identities, and situational identities. Core identities are fairly stable and dominant; they exist for a relatively long time and change only in situations of considerable social shifting. Some core identities persist

throughout an individual's entire lifetime. Short-term identities are inconstant, and changes to them occur frequently. Situational identities are connected to concrete situations and depend on those situations. They are a 'building material' for the creation of short-term and core identities" (Korostelina, 2007: 50-51). On the basis of the researches on relations between members of two competing ethnic minorities in the Crimea, Korostelina argues that "core identities can remain, however, even in the situation of the destruction and disappearance of their respective social groups: identity-related processes continue to be organized in the same way that they had been within the whole system in the past. Consider, for example, the Soviet identity in the population of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In spite of the disappearance of the common 'Soviet people', Soviet identity still occupies a leading place as a core identity among middle-aged and elderly people".

Our hypothesis in the current study is to "test" the symbols of World War II as expected core symbols of the identity of both ethnic groups – Estonians and Estonian Russians (using student respondents at International University Audentes). We expect here that opposite poles used for creation of the bipolar construct probably show the split in the society; i.e. Estonians probably claim the Bronze Soldier monument as symbol of WW II is not a part of their identity while Russians are likely to admit that this monument forms one of the core symbols of their identity.

## **5. The Sample and the Study Instrument**

In order to investigate the background of identity related processes, the authors have used Identity Structure Analysis several times since 1993 (Tuisk 1994, Kirch *et al* 2001; Kirch, Tuisk, and Talts 2004, Kirch and Tuisk 2007). The experience of all earlier studies was taken into account in the planning phase of the study and for the preparation of the study instrument.

The fieldwork was carried out at International University Audentes (Tallinn, Estonia). The sample comprised 100 respondents (students of social sciences and business administration), with numbers almost equally distributed between the two criterion groups – Estonians (n=54) and Estonian Russians (n=46). Of Estonians 45% were female and 55% were



male, while among Russians the gender distribution was equal. Age distribution varied from 18-37, most falling within the 18-22 year age bracket.

The questionnaires to fill in were given to each person in their mother tongue. Instructions about how to complete them were also given by a respective native speaker. Students were chosen as a target group in order to access the active part of the population and also in order to access respondents who had grown up during Estonia's period of re-independence. The assumption of the authors was that Estonians and Estonian Russians have had different experiences in this situation. That is, despite a number of shared characteristics (age range, occupation, and rather similar general fields of study), it was expected that the two sets of respondents would experience their social worlds (and thus construe their identity) from differing perspectives.

This assertion about the influences on Estonian Russians' stereotypes was confirmed also by a representative public opinion survey that was carried out in June 2007 where 1,000 Estonians and 500 Russians were questioned. The object of this study was to investigate interethnic relations and determine the challenges to integration policies after the 'Bronze Soldier' crisis in Estonia. The main finding is as follows: while 66% of Estonians shared the opinion that moving the monument from the Tallinn centre was the government's only choice, and 5% named it as totally unfortunate, then it was vice versa among Russians, where only 5% supported the moving and 56% considered this action as totally unfortunate (University of Tartu, Saar Poll and Office of the Population Minister, 2007: 28).

The instrument used was specially designed for our ISA study and consisted of 11 rating sheets, each headed by a bipolar construct (i.e. a pair of opposing values/beliefs). Respondents were asked to construe specific entities against these constructs, on a zero-centred rating scale.

Within the ISA framework, certain entities are mandatory (i.e. current, past, and aspirational selves, an admired person and a disliked person); these form the basis of the individual value-system and form a binding between individual and group identity. At the same time our instrument included entities reflecting the respondent's socio-biographical context (e.g. my parents) and from the wider socio-cultural domain (e.g. the Estonian

government, and respective ethnic groups like Estonians, Estonian Russians and Russians in Russia). The authors expected that Estonian and Russian respondents' evaluation of these entities would help to test the research hypothesis.

The constructs themselves were chosen to reflect essential issues and life in contemporary Estonia. Because of the nature of the study, attention was focused primarily on issues of Estonian language and culture within a globalising world and on the influence of Russia on Estonia. We "tested" also the symbols of World War II in the case of both ethnic groups. Also broader issues such as 'feels European' and the threat of globalisation giving the possibility to facilitate one's emigration were also included for each ethnic group in the study instrument. See the full instrument in the Appendix.

## **6. Results**

### ***6.1. Patterns of identification***


#### ***6.1.1. Positive role models: idealistic identification with others.***

Positive role models are those entities who are perceived as possessing qualities to which individuals aspire, i.e. with whom they idealistically identify. In Figure 6.1 these entities have been ordered according the value of an index that can vary from 0...1. The index value has been considered high when above 0.70 and low when below 0.50.

As expected, Estonians' very high idealistic identification with the government (0.83) and their own ethnic group (0.82) can be easily explained by recent events described in part 3 of this paper. Unexpectedly, Estonian Russians also show higher idealistic identification with Estonians (0.61) than with their own "titular" group, called here 'Estonian Russians' (0.57). Despite a slight difference (0.04) these index values still remain moderate. We also have to mention that the highest positive role model for Estonian Russians is 'parents', which can be explained as an entity found in the search for the origin of stability in the disorder caused by the April 2007 events.

We can conclude here briefly that ‘Estonian Russians’ as a unit do not form a group to identify with, rather both Estonians as such and the parents of Russian speakers form a more positive role model. This example demonstrates the heterogeneity of Estonian Russians, while this entity as such seems to be a fuzzy role model for idealistic identification. It seems we can suppose that even if there exists any kind of common category to “label” Russians in Estonia, it is not directly related to their ethnicity

**Figure 6.1.**




There should be other dominants that bind these people on a different basis (e.g. local identity or religion, etc.). In the case of Estonians, those very high index levels (‘Estonians’ and ‘Estonian government’) express loyalty to the government that managed to handle the situation in April 2007 and to Estonian statehood as such, more than “simple support” for these entities.

### ***6.1.2. Negative role models: contra identification with others***

Contra Identification pertains to negative role models, i.e. entities from whose (perceived) attributes the respondent wishes to dissociate (Weinreich,

1980/1986). The contra-identification index values are considered high when above 0.45 and low when below 0.25. Figure 6.2. shows that ‘Russians in Russia’ form the group both Estonians and Estonian Russians contra-identify the most, and we notice that here the Estonians’ index value is very high while the Russians’ value (0.44) almost reaches the high level. The second position to contra-identify with for both groups is ‘Estonian Russians’ (the values are 0.59 and 0.38 respectively).

**Figure 6. 2.**




### **6.1.3. Empathetic Identification**

In order to investigate current perceptions of the surrounding environment more precisely, the authors also used “the empathetic mode of identification, which refers to self’s sense of an identity existing between self and the other in actuality – of having characteristics in common irrespective of whether these might be for emulation or dissociation”. The extent of one’s current empathetic identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and those of one’s current self-image. (Weinreich, 2003, 60). The ISA

considers the value of the index high when above 0.70 and low when below 0.50.

From Figure 6.3. we can see that Estonians have very high empathetic identification with the government, 'Estonians', and parents, while Russians reach the higher level only in their identification with their parents. Also 'Estonian Russians' plays a rather significant role for them, attaining a value of 0.66.

**Figure 6.3.**




#### **6.1.4. Conflicted Identification**

If one empathetically identifies with another while simultaneously contra-identifying with that person, one's identification with the person in question is conflicted. In other words, one has a conflicted identification with another when one is as the other in various respects, while wishing not to be so in

certain of these and other respects – *one is represented in the other, while wishing not to be* (Weinreich 2003, 60).

From Figure 6.4. we notice that the highest identification conflict among both groups is with ‘Estonian Russians’. As the index value here is considered to be high when between 0.35 and 0.50 we see that 0.47 and 0.46 match this level. Overall conflicted identification with ‘Estonian Russians’ becomes rather clear as expected ‘carriers’ of this identity (i.e. Russian respondents) do obviously share and accept “their own group’s” values while at the same time contra-identifying with these same values. What we can conclude at this point is that ‘Estonian Russians’ is a category which has conflicted identification values common for both Estonian and Russian speaking respondents, and both groups want to dissociate from this entity strongly.

**Figure 6.4.**



## **6.2. Identity variants**

In order to understand the matters behind the conflicted identity levels, the ISA uses identity diffusion as a characteristic. Identity diffusion is

considered to be the dispersion of conflicted identifications with others, where the greater the magnitude of identification conflicts and the more extensive their dispersion across others, the more severe is the diffusion (Weinreich, 2003, 64). When we combine self-evaluation with identity diffusion, 9 identity variants result. The combinations are presented in Table 6.2.1. (Weinreich, 2003a, 106).

**Table 6.2.1. The identity variant classification**

Self-evaluation	Identity diffusion		
	High (diffused variants)	Moderate	Low (foreclosed variants)
High	Diffuse high self-regard	Confident	Defensive high self-regard
Moderate	Diffusion	Indeterminate	Defensive
Low	Crisis	Negative	Defensive negative

In Table 6.2.2. the results of a study of the distribution of these identity variants are shown. We first focus on ‘defensive high self-regard’, that is common for ca 1/5 of Estonian respondents. This group has high self-evaluation and low identity diffusion. This type of identity variant has been considered as a foreclosed variant, meaning that instead of moderate conflicts, which is considered optimal, here the low level of identity conflicts together with high self-esteem shows strong defensiveness against possible “attacks”.

Estonian researcher Prof. Raivo Vetik warns also about the presence of such a trend among Estonians and envisions this phenomenon as a possible threat to the integration of the society (Vetik, 2008). He relates Estonians’ behaviour to the ‘closed nationalism’ propagated as a widespread ideology by the authorities (when the government ignored Russian demonstrators’ demand ‘not to move the monument’ to the war cemetery from the city centre). Based on our research, we notice that although there exists a category involving such a contingent, it is decently low. Besides ‘defensive

high self-regard' discussed here, we see that, in fact, variants such as 'confident' and 'indeterminate' dominate among Estonian respondents.

In the case of Russians it is noticeable that more than 1/3 of the respondents belongs to a variant called 'diffusion'. When we sum up all of those Russian respondents who have high identity diffusion, we notice this number (26) exceeds even 56% of respondents while for Estonians it reaches just 24% (13 respondents out of 54).

**Table 6.2.2. Distribution of Identity Variants**

<i>Identity variant</i>	<i>Estonians</i>	<i>Russians</i>
<i>Diffuse high self-regard</i>	2	5
<i>Diffusion</i>	8	<b>17</b>
<i>Crisis</i>	3	4
<i>Confident</i>	<b>13</b>	5
<i>Indeterminate</i>	<b>14</b>	8
<i>Negative</i>	1	-
<i>Defensive high self-regard</i>	<b>11</b>	2
<i>Defensive</i>	2	5
<i>Defensive negative</i>	-	-

The high identity diffusion (weighted index value=0.39) of all Russians indicates overall and strong identity conflict that is even more explanatory regarding the identity processes than the separate conflicted identification values presented by Figure 6.4.

### **6.3. Structural pressure**

Structural pressure refers to the consistency with which a particular construct is used in the appraisal of self and others. This consistency derives



from the compatibility of the construct's evaluative connotations with one's overall evaluation of the identities to which it is attributed.

**Table 6.3. Core constructs of Estonian and Russian respondents**

Estonians			Russians		
No	Construct	SP	No	Construct	SP
11	Bronze Soldier is not related to my identity	84.97***	7	Media and internet of Russia influence Russians in Estonia	57.06*
9	Soviet Union was the occupier of Eastern Europe in WWII	82.19***	11	Bronze Soldier is one of the symbols of my identity	55.62*
4	Russia's policies towards its neighbours are aggressive	71.01***	5	It is easy to melt into Estonian society by knowing the language	49.45
5	It is easy to melt into Estonian society by knowing the language	67.50**	6	Estonian government is responsible for hard economic situation of the population	48.70
7	Media and internet of Russia influence Russians in Estonia	67.00**	3	Estonian Russians have more in common with Estonia, their country of residence	48.62
8	Estonian language and culture have history, traditions, and future	65.62**	8	Estonian language and culture have history, traditions, and future	48.08
10	Intends to bind future definitely with Estonia	57.79*			
2	Estonia has expectancy for fast economic development as its economy is flexible and innovative	54.32*			

Note: Structural pressure (SP) is scaled from -100 to 100. 'Core' evaluative dimensions are \*\*\*70-79; \*\*60-69; \*50-59. In the table above also SP > 48.00 has been shown to illustrate the trend and facilitate better description of structural pressure among both groups although all levels below 50 are considered as moderate and do not form the 'core'.

Table 6.3. shows the construct marking the Bronze Soldier monument's role in one's evaluation as having the strongest structural pressure among Estonian respondents (84.97\*\*\*) and is ranked as the second in the case of Russians (55.62\*). As expected, opposite poles of the construct apply here - Estonians claim the Bronze Soldier monument as a symbol of WW II is not a part of their identity while Russians agree that this forms one of the core symbols of their identity.

The second and third strongest structural pressures measured for Estonians underline the Soviet Union's occupier role in WWII (82.19\*\*\*) followed by Russia's aggressive policies towards its neighbours (71.01\*\*\*). The latter reflects a still existing fear about WW II's historical outcomes concerning Estonia and their reoccurrence.

We have to notice that for Russians the strongest structural pressure is given by their acknowledgement of the role of Russia's media plays on themselves (57.06\*). Unexpectedly, Russian respondents have ranked also the construct about Estonian language's key role in integration into society positively (49.45), and this construct is even ranked third. We think here we can see some positive outcome of the government's continuous efforts in emphasising the importance of the language as a prerequisite and tool for successful integration of all different ethnic groups into Estonian society. This third ranking also helps disprove a rather often expressed attitude (by some sceptics) that Estonian language command has no use and does not grant smooth acceptance of a foreigner by Estonians.

The fourth position among Russian respondents is held by a construct that claims that the government is responsible for the difficult economic situation (48.70). In the light of the April 2007 events, we can see on the one hand that the government has been made responsible for "everything", but on the other hand we have to take into account that this can express respondents' nostalgia about Soviet era governments, which really did have to grant jobs and accommodation together with healthcare to every single working person.

Both Estonians and Russians show their trust that the Estonian language and culture have traditions and a future by positioning this construct at the same level (as the sixth). When we compare the values, we see that the Estonians' index (65.62\*\*) has a higher value than the Russians' (48.08) - as expected.

Despite interesting findings expressed by the index values of idealistic and contra identification and of structural pressure, we can see from Table 6.3. that Russians' 'core' evaluative constructs have not been so strongly formed as for Estonian respondents. This leads us to a new search for the factors really having influence. An attempt toward this was made by creating new subgroup typologies.

#### ***6.4. Group typologies***

In addition to ISA specific indices "classical" data analysis was also carried out to help to form some typologies based on core evaluative constructs ranked in Figure 6.3. For all typologies presented below two constructs were combined based on answers to 'Me as I am now'. Those who expressed their attitude about both constructs on either the left or the right side of the instrument's scale were chosen. Those who marked zero or did not answer are not included here.

##### ***Typology I***

This typology was created on the basis of two constructs (no.2 and no.6 in the Appendix) as we see from Figure 6.5.

Four groups were formed as follows:

*State dependent optimists* – The Estonian government is responsible for economic well-being, and Estonia has the likelihood of fast economic development;

*Liberal optimists* – Each person has to manage alone, and Estonia has the likelihood of fast economic development;


*State dependent sceptics* – The Estonian government is responsible for people's economic well-being, and Estonia has no likelihood of fast economic development;

*Liberal sceptics* - Each person has to manage alone, and Estonia has no likelihood of fast economic development.

The largest group among both Estonians (44%) and Russians (46%) is 'State dependent optimists' i.e. those who have trust in Estonia's future and fast development while also believing that the government should take care of each and every person's economic well-being. The second strongest group among Estonians is 'Liberal optimists' who also believe in Estonia's future,

but at the same time are also convinced that a person has to manage on his/her own (39%).

**Figure 6.5**



In the case of Russians, we cannot see such a polarization, their typology is more fragmented. The second strongest Russian group is ‘State dependent sceptics’ who do not believe in Estonia’s future although they believe that government has to take care of their economic well-being.


***Typology II***

Here we analyse Estonian and Russian respondents depending on their answers about Estonia’s future and about the role of the Soviet Union in World War II. To see the exact wording of the questions used in Figure 6.6, see constructs no. 2 and no. 9 in the Appendix. More than ¾ of Estonians express their optimism about Estonia’s future and at the same time claim that the Soviet Union was the occupier in WWII.

The same typology group includes only 13% of Russian respondents while more than 1/3 of Russians say that although they believe in Estonia’s

success, the Soviet Union was a liberator of Eastern Europe in World War II.

**Figure 6. 6**




Our study results show that two approaches exist among Russian respondents simultaneously: Estonia-centred (e.g. belief in Estonia's development and integration in a common nationality) and Soviet-centred (e.g. identification with the bronze soldier, identification with historical symbols of evaluation of the Soviet past).

### ***6.5. The Role of Language in Media Consumption***

From the analyses presented in sections 6.2. (Identity Variants) and 6.3. (Structural Pressure), we can notice that there exists a visible difference between Estonians and Russians; and the Figures 6.7. and 6.8. illustrate also different media consumption patterns reported by the respondents.


Figure 6.7



In addition to structural pressure rankings in the previous section about the role of Russia’s media (TV Channels and internet) that forms the strongest ‘core’ evaluative dimension for Estonian Russians, we clearly notice here – after summing up ‘only in own language’ and ‘mostly in own language’ (Figure 6.7.) - that more than ½ (53%) of Estonian Russians’ are strongly influenced by ideology advanced from information channels transmitted from Russia.

Both TV and the written press were followed by Estonians dominantly in their mother tongue while for Russians the picture was more diverse. The distribution of different “media consumption groups” based on a different degree of media language mixes also supports the authors’ idea that media sources (here Estonian vs. Russian) which are contradictory by their content can have a controversial influence on a person’s attitudes and self identifications, which, in turn, can lead to various types of identity diffusion variants which formed as a result of the Identity Structure Analysis carried out within the current study.

**Figure 6.8**



## 7. Conclusions

Findings of the analysis suggest that the April 2007 events on the streets of Tallinn appear to be strongly related to the role of the Soviet Union in WW II, where its construction as ‘occupier of Eastern Europe (as opposed to ‘liberator’) forms a ‘core evaluative dimension of identity’ for the Estonians, alongside ‘the Bronze Soldier’ having no symbolic salience or relation to the Estonian identity while for Russians the monument is continuously one of the core symbols of their identity.

Also, we have to admit that the April 2007 events in Tallinn have created a still operational strong base for conflicted identifications among Estonian Russian youth. Without strong belief in the unity of their own “titular” group as such, their identificational aspirations turn first towards their parents, followed by ‘Estonians’. The values of structural pressure show that, alongside Estonians, even Russians have optimism about the continuity of the Estonian language and culture within a globalising world. Estonians and Russians both share a strong understanding of the key role of the Estonian language for integration into society.

It is evident that Estonians have mobilised themselves, and the 2007 events have even facilitated this new unity together with optimistic beliefs about the future through being an EU and NATO member state, while Russian media, Russia's perceived hostility towards its neighbours and the history of World War II still remain in their minds not letting them forget the past.

In general, for Russians it is clear that their (Estonian Russians') integration mechanism is going to be via the Estonian language and culture, and our research indicates convergence in values with Estonians taking place. At the same time, significant symbols such as the 'bronze soldier' still have their role in Russians' memories and attitudes, causing conflicted identifications leading to the high identity diffusion that restricts smooth integration into Estonian society.

Our study results show that two approaches exist among Russian respondents simultaneously: Estonia-centred (e.g. belief in Estonia's development and integration in a common nationality) and Soviet-centred (e.g. identification with the Bronze soldier, identification with historical symbols of evaluation the Soviet past).

This study reinforced our view that the integration process has become more complicated than was expected in Estonia about 20 years ago. However, the answers, gathered with ISA study, showed that most of the respondents' life experience has created a positive attitude concerning integration issues; they possess preconditions (e.g. belief in the role of the Estonian language as an integrator) for moving towards Estonia-centred dominants within their identity structure.

The role of Russia's media and the internet cannot be underestimated in the case of Estonian Russians (as this forms their strongest 'core' evaluative dimension). We see that Estonian Russians' adaptation to Estonian society is influenced by ideology promoted by Russia's information channels. Unfortunately, interpretation of the Soviet Union's (including Estonia's) history in some certain aspects remains unchanged. This is also why there are young Russians who still have a one-sided cliché in their minds, for instance about World War II. Although most of these young Russians have learned the state language (Estonian), and, as we see, this is a precondition for integration, we still cannot take this fact as an indicator of a successful integration process in all of its comprehensiveness.



By now all Estonian people have experienced life in the European Union for four years, and this has deepened both Estonians' and Russians' emotional credit towards the EU. The most notable factor in this process has been rapid economic growth; at the same time improvement of personal well-being has mostly been experienced by young people. Estonian respondents, in this study, are characterised first of all by indicator '*high trust in the government*' (demonstrated by idealistic identification). The authors' guess is that this trust also shows support for the belief of the government's efforts being responsible for fast economic development and stability followed by a low unemployment rate.

### **Acknowledgements**

Special thanks to Prof. Dr. Peter Weinreich and Dr. Wendy Saunderson for encouraging the authors to prepare this article.

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<b>Appendix</b>		<b>&lt;1&gt;</b>		<b>Does not/do not feel European at all</b>
	<b>Feels her/himself European</b>			
	<b>Me as I am now</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Estonians</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Government of Estonian Republic</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Me as I was 4 years ago</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Russians in Estonia</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Person, whom I admire highly</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Person whom I don't like at all</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>My parents e.g. someone of the generation of my father and my mother</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Russians in Russia</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	
	<b>Me as I would like to be</b>	- - - - 0 - - -	-	

**1 L Feels her/himself European**  
**1 R Does not/do not feel European at all**

**2 L Estonia has the likelihood of fast economic development as its  
economy is flexible and innovative**  
**2 R Estonia hasn't any likelihood of fast development as the country is  
small and resources are low**

**3 L Russians living in Estonia have more in common with Estonia as of their country of residence**

**3 R Estonian Russians feel more in common with Russia as with the country of their origin**

**4 L Russia's policies towards its neighbouring countries are aggressive**

**4 R Russia's policies towards its neighbouring countries are amicable**

**5 L It is easy to melt into Estonian society by knowing the Estonian language**

**5 R It is hard to melt into Estonian society even when one has full command of the Estonian language**

**6 L The Estonian government is responsible for the difficult economic situation of the population**

**6 R First at all everyone has to manage himself/herself**

**7 L Russian media and internet influences attitudes of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in a great degree**

**7 R Russian media and internet do not influence the attitudes of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia**

**8 L Estonian language and culture have history, traditions and a future**

**8 R Estonian culture and language are destined to vanish in a globalising world**

**9 L The Soviet Union was the liberator of Eastern Europe in WW II**

**9 R The Soviet Union was the occupier of Eastern Europe in WW II**

**10 L Intends/intend to bind his/her future definitely with Estonia – to live and work here**

**10 R Want/wants to live and work in some other country of the European Union or in the USA**

**11 L The Bronze Soldier is one of the symbols of (my) identity**

**11 R The Bronze Soldier has no relation to my identity.**