EU FOREIGN POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

MUNEVVER CEBECI

This study is based on two major arguments. One of them is that the significance of the Mediterranean for the EU has clearly increased after September 11, 2001. The second argument, on the other hand, is that the EU is well-equipped to confront the challenge of terrorism; nevertheless, the effectiveness of its policies depends heavily on the political will of its Member States which seems inadequate for the time being. This paper first analyses the outlook of world politics after September 11 with a special emphasis on terrorism as the dark side of globalisation and then evaluates the policy instruments employed by the EU in its counter-terrorism efforts. The cross-pillar approach adopted by the EU and how the European foreign policy is (and can be) used within this context are all considered. Finally, the significance of the Mediterranean region with regard to terrorism is analysed in detail and the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is assessed and emphasised.

Terrorism and/in the Globalized World: Construction of “the Global Risk Society”1?

September 11 is significant for its clear message that nobody is safe and even the most powerful state in the world is vulnerable. On the other hand, it is a clear indication of the reflexive nature of globalisation. Terrorism has been there for a long time, but it was this particular devastating event that made analysts declare openly that it was “the dark side of globalisation”2.

It has become commonplace to call Western societies “risk societies”\(^3\) after the start of the process of modernisation. After September 11, a new term is used by Ulrich Beck to define the globality of the risk that confronts the world as a whole: “global risk society”\(^4\). Just as the risk societies suffer from the reflexive nature of modernity; the global risk society suffers from the reflexive nature of globalisation. In Beck’s view, the global risk society “emerges in and consists of the perceived urgency in the global consequences of civilizational actions, regardless of whether these consequences of globality are produced through information-technological networks, financial flows, natural crises, cultural symbols, the threatening climatic disaster or the threat of terrorism”\(^5\).

It is thus the reflexivity of the global risk society that, first, breaks through the silence of words and makes us painfully conscious of the globality in our own life context, and that, second, forms new lines of conflict and alliances. What has been shown in the case of the modern nation-state - that it is held together by continuous communication about the threats it faces - also seems to prove true for the global risk society.\(^6\)

Although terrorism is only one of the many risks facing the global risk society, the shocking events of September 11 revealed that the terrorist risk was more imminent and dangerous than expected. It is a fact that globalisation has some side effects such as the growing gap between the rich and the poor, mass migration, international organised crime that includes illicit arms and drugs trafficking as well as human trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new kind of terrorism that became the focus of discussions after September 11 is especially significant for its unprecedented use of the gifts of modernity and globalisation (such as free market economies, the internet, democratic structures,}

---

5 Ibid, p. 259.
6 Ibid.
technological advancements, etc) as tools to facilitate terrorist acts. This is also why many analysts contend that radical Islamist terrorists, who seem to oppose modernity and globalisation, in fact, represent an alternative sort of modernity\(^7\) since they use all the modern tools in perpetrating their acts. Beck contends:

“The opponents of globalisation and its supporters share the same global communications media. Globalisation’s opponents operate, by the same token, on the basis of global rights, global markets and global networks. They also think and act in global categories for which, through their actions, they create a global public sphere and global attention.”\(^8\)

Therefore, it would not be erroneous to suggest that terrorism represents a perfect example to define the reflexive nature of globalisation. This is exactly why terrorism is called as “the dark side of globalisation”. Nevertheless, the fact that terrorism represents a perfect example for defining the reflexivity of globalisation does not and should not mean that it is the only risk that is facing the world today. This *forma mentis* would not only degrade the importance of other risks in the face of terrorism but might lead to the adoption of severe security measures that inevitably lead to restrictions on civil liberties.

Perhaps, too much emphasis has been put on terrorism after September 11. The long-soughtfor enemy of the post-Cold War era has been found; at least and especially by the USA\(^9\). The arguments


\(^{9}\) Ken Booth and Tim Dunne contend: “At the end of the Cold War the United States lost the Soviet Empire but did not find a role. It did when the ‘post-Cold War’ collided with the future on 9/11 and became ‘the war against terrorism’.” (Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, (2002) “Worlds in Collision”, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision*, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan): 19). This statement shows that terrorism has been constructed not only as the most important threat facing the world, but also as the major factor that led to the definition of the new role of the US in the post-Cold War: the Cold
identifying the new threat as terrorism have quickly replaced those which said that the new threats in the post-Cold War era were instability and uncertainty. Of course, terrorism has always been there with the same degree of importance, nevertheless, it was not considered with the same degree of seriousness that is attached to it right now. If the September 11 attacks had not been directed against the US (or another Western state) terrorism would not have been the focus of this much attention at the international level, even if it had led to the same number of casualties in other parts of the world. This is a crucial point to be underlined since it marks the problem with the perception and definition of security and terrorism.

The fact that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism is the major reason behind differences in the international community with regard the perception of terrorism as a security threat. So, what is terrorism and is it really the threat that faces the world today? Terrorism usually (but not always) appears in the form of an asymmetrical strategy employed by the weak against the strong - and in the recent example, in the form of a network war\(^\text{10}\) (with hard security implications) - to create public (and now global) fear and thus to achieve political ends.

The most important point about “defining terrorism” is that it is a rather relative term. Even the countries that are under a particular threat of terrorism may regard terrorist acts directed at other countries as acts of insurgency or even freedom fighting. This is especially why it is hard to take universal measures against

---

War’s saviour would now become the pioneer of the war against terrorism. The exaggerated security discourse on terrorism, actually, has become a way to justify US dominance in the world.

terrorism. The phrase “one’s terrorist, the other’s freedom fighter” summarises the difficulty of finding a common definition of and effective measures against terrorism.

It is the difficulties with finding a common definition that led analysts to attempt to define terrorism by the act rather than by the motive behind it. In this way, even those acts committed with a noble cause but through terrorist methods would be regarded as acts of terror. Despite these attempts at identifying the terrorist acts, the relative nature of the term still creates problems. Chomsky’s piece entitled “Who are the Global Terrorists?” clearly reflects that those acts that fall into the category of commonly accepted terrorist acts may also be committed by states but when the unit of analysis is the state (especially the modern and powerful state), they are not referred to as terrorist acts but rather as “‘counter-terror’ or ‘low-intensity warfare’ or ‘self-defence’”11. This is why the definition of terrorist acts also seems a rather subjective exercise. If one cannot define the problem then, how can one find the right strategy to fight it?

It is crucial to identify the root-causes of a problem in order to deal with it. The same logic applies for terrorism as well. Despite its hard security implications, terrorism actually has social, political economic and cultural roots. Identification of the root causes of terrorism is especially important for selecting the tools to be employed in order to solve the problem. Tackling the root causes of terrorism seems a long-term project whereas measures such as the use of military force against terrorist bases, etc. provide short-term solutions although they may prove hazardous in the long run.

**Counter-terrorism Measures and European Foreign Policy**

Despite the immediate unanimous support provided by the EU to the US immediately after the attacks, it can be contended that the EU’s approach to terrorism and its counter-terrorism measures

---

differ significantly from those of the US. It goes without saying that the US rather prefers a short-term approach based heavily on military response to terrorism. On the contrary, the EU’s approach, as expected, is softer and relies intensively on long-term solutions which involve an identification of the root-causes of terrorism and the selection of apposite tools that will be used to eliminate these root-causes.

The first step taken by the EU in response to international terrorism was to reach a common definition of terrorism and to decide on the ways to penalize terrorists. Furthermore, the Union made a list of international terrorist organisations in order to be able to deal with them directly and effectively. The EU also adopted the “European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism” which laid down the guidelines for counter-terrorism efforts.

The EU uses a cross-pillar approach in its counter-terrorism efforts in the sense that a wide range of instruments that are spread through all the three pillars are used for this purpose. This cross-pillar approach is crucial for maintaining the desired degree of consistency between the three pillars and the effective implementation of counter-terrorism measures. Furthermore, all those different sources which nurture terrorism (from financial resources to criminal networks and state support for terrorism) necessitate such a cross-pillar approach. Therefore, policy coordination between the institutions responsible for the three pillars seems a precondition for effective counter measures. Despite all the literature on the weaknesses of the CFSP, it should be admitted that the wide range of policy instruments that can be employed for foreign policy purposes gives the EU a unique strength in this regard. This is not to claim that the CFSP is flawless, but rather to argue that it also has crucial strengths.


With regard to the use of first pillar instruments in counterterrorism efforts, it can be said that technical and financial assistance; development and reconstruction aid; humanitarian aid; and donation programmes are employed within this framework. A freezing of terrorist assets is ensured through the directives on the freezing of funds and fight against money laundering. Furthermore, besides the “essential element” clauses seen in all association, economic cooperation and trade agreements concluded by the EU, new association agreements made with Algeria, Lebanon and Chile also include clauses on cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The EU provides financial assistance to Pakistan and is a donor for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Moreover, through a wide range of policy realms such as transport policy, Europe-wide measures against terrorism are taken.

In the CFSP pillar, bilateral dialogue with countries and different regions has been accelerated within the context of the fight against terrorism. The EU attaches special importance to the conflict in the Middle East with similar motives and has thus increased its efforts to solve the problem through active participation in the Quartet (the US, The UN, the EU and Russia). It has also decided to act against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which feed terrorism. In spite of the fact that the EU members could not agree on an ESDP effort to counter terrorism, the Union is searching for ways to use this mechanism in the fight against this global threat. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the non-military nature of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures may be overshadowed by an intensive use of the ESDP in this regard. This would definitely erode the EU’s unique strength in countering terrorism - i.e. the strength of its civilian approach and its emphasis on the root causes of terrorism. This is why ESDP’s further inclusion in the fight against terrorism might engender negative consequences. On the other hand, it is a fact that any foreign policy needs military support for credibility and effectiveness, and the ESDP can be used in such ways to support the EU’s efforts as a last resort rather than for direct engagement from the start.

Finally, the third pillar, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), is crucial for the fight against terrorism as it involves police
and judicial cooperation. The EU has adopted several measures to increase cooperation in this field. Furthermore, it has adopted a European Arrest Warrant within this context which facilitates the extradition of criminals. Eurojust was established in 2002 “to enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within Member States when they are dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime”\textsuperscript{14}. Furthermore, Europol has assumed a central role in the fight against terrorism after September 11\textsuperscript{15}. The Counter Terrorism Unit established under the auspices of Europol is tasked with collecting, sharing and analysing information concerning international terrorism. Member States are also allowed to establish provisional Joint Investigation Teams\textsuperscript{16}. The EU attaches special importance to cooperation in the field of JHA with third countries. It has been actively involved in multilateral (such as the UN and OSCE) and bilateral (e.g. with the US, Canada, Japan and Russia) frameworks to further such cooperation.

On the other hand, the EU seeks ways to tighten external border controls. A European Borders Agency is also being established in the JHA field to be made operational by 1 January 2005. It can be contended that the EU pays special attention to immigration which may be regarded as among the facilitating conditions for terrorism in particular and a security problem in general. A new regulation on the return of illegal immigrants has been adopted to control immigration.

Upon the March 11 Madrid attacks, the Brussels European Council adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism on 25 March 2004, in which all the Member States and the EU itself pledged to do everything in their power to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Union. Under the heading “Strategic Objectives for a Revised EU Plan of Action

\textsuperscript{14} “What is Eurojust?” Eurojust’s Website: \url{http://www.eurojust.eu.int/index.htm}.


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
to Combat Terrorism”, the Declaration provides that the EU should address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism and that it should target actions under the EU external relations towards priority third countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced\textsuperscript{17}.

Under the heading “International Cooperation” in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, it is stated that the EU should ensure effective and practical cooperation with third countries in combating terrorism, in particular, through the following measures:

Development of technical assistance strategies, to assist vulnerable third countries in enhancing their counter-terrorism capability, and by addressing counter-terrorism concerns into all relevant external assistance programmes to promote good governance and the rule of law ensure that counter terrorism is a key element of political dialogue at all levels with third countries, in particular those which represent a potential terrorist threat to international peace and security. The European Union will analyse and evaluate the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis. This will be an influencing factor in EU relations with them.\textsuperscript{18}

The last two measures listed above refer to an effective use of EU conditionality with regard to counter-terrorism efforts in third countries. The statement that the EU’s future relations will depend on the countries’ efforts in this respect is a clear indication of this fact. It would also not be surprising if counter-terrorism were added among “democracy, human rights and the rule of law” in the essential element clauses in EU’s future agreements with third countries.

With regard to the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts, the Declaration’s call for the optimum use of all EU police resources deployed in

\textsuperscript{17} Declaration on Combating Terrorism adopted by the European Council at Brussels on 25 March 2004; accessed through: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/79635.pdf.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
third countries in the context of EU crisis-management is also significant. This is because the ESDP acquires a new role in the EU’s fight against terrorism in this respect. The implicit call in the Declaration for further ESDP involvement in the fight against terrorism is also crucial in this regard.

Finally, the establishment of the position of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (which is adopted in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism) is a crucial step in the EU’s fight against terrorism. It is expected that the establishment of such a position will provide the Union with a “comprehensive and strongly coordinated” approach against the threat of terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is tasked to coordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism and, with due regard to the responsibilities of the Commission, to maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions. The tasks of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator clearly reflect the cross-pillar nature of the EU’s fight against terrorism and will be crucial in maintaining consistency between the three pillars in this respect.

All in all, it can be argued that the EU is well-equipped to tackle the challenges brought about by September 11. The EU’s emphasis on the root causes of terrorism, and, its mainly non-military and cross-pillar approach, mark the Union’s difference from other international actors. Nevertheless, there are also many criticisms about EU’s approach, especially in terms of its effectiveness, and it should not be forgotten that instruments can only function as long as they are supported by political will. There is no gainsaying that the EU needs to work on its problem of lack of political will behind its foreign policy. The latest developments over Iraq have clearly revealed the need for further Europeanization of national foreign policies of EU Member States.

\[^{19} \text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{20} \text{Ibid.}\]
The Mediterranean and the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts

The significance of the Mediterranean with regard to European security has increased considerably after September 11, especially because of the fact that the Mediterranean with its nature as the meeting point of three religions, and the stage for at least three intractable conflicts and economic and social and political grievances, constitutes an important challenge in the EU’s neighbourhood. Illegal immigration from and through the Mediterranean, and the region’s location as a favourite route for illicit arms and drugs trafficking increase its significance especially because these are crucial components of terrorism. The fact that there are significant number of people (as residents or citizens) in the EU who have origins in the Mediterranean or the Middle East and the region’s geographical proximity - the two factors which have made the Mediterranean crucial for the EC/EU especially since the 1970s - also mark the region’s importance in the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts.

It would not be erroneous to suggest that “instability and chaos in the Mediterranean is perceived as a source of insecurity for Europe”\textsuperscript{21}. It is a fact that many countries in the Mediterranean suffer from bad governance (which is the major factor that leads to state failure) and organised crime, that the region itself is torn by conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) and that terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction find a fertile ground to flourish under such circumstances. All these problems facing the region appear as the key threats listed in the EU’s Strategy Paper\textsuperscript{22}. The European Strategy Paper also makes special reference to the Mediterranean, stating:


“The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with the Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.”

The fact that many states in the Mediterranean are challenged by radical Islamists add to the concerns over the region. Radical Islamist terror which has become the major security threat in recent years capitalises on the economic, political and social unrest in the region and especially on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Istanbul and Madrid bombings have clearly demonstrated that the target of radical Islamist terror is not only the US but also Europe. With the impact of these recent bombings, the Mediterranean’s security significance for Europe has increased considerably.

It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that in order to tackle terrorism the question of the Mediterranean should be tackled first. Only when the Mediterranean becomes a more stable region can the EU feel more secure. The EU already employs serious instruments in its relations with the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process, the New Neighbourhood Policy and the initiative of EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as bilateral relations between the EU and the countries in the region.

The Barcelona Process which started in November 1995 has been the foundation of relations with the Mediterranean as a region. Its major aims have been to create a zone of peace and stability through a political and security partnership; to create an area of shared prosperity through economic and financial partnership; and to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in order to promote understanding between cultures, with a special

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
emphasis on the development of civil societies. The EU adopted a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region in order to further the Euro-Med partnership. In this common strategy, the guidelines of the Euro-Med partnership were outlined as follows: to develop good neighbourly relations; to improve prosperity; to eliminate poverty; to promote and protect all human rights and freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of law; to promote cultural and religious tolerance; and to develop cooperation with civil society, including NGOs.

In the Security Strategy Paper, it is stated: “Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” [Emphasis added] What is more, the Union’s New Neighbourhood Policy has a specific emphasis on the Mediterranean in this respect. The prospect of a stake in the EU’s four freedoms and the benchmarks introduced by this policy clearly reflect that despite the lack of the use of the leverage of enlargement in its relations with the non-European Mediterranean countries; the EU will acquire a credible tool of conditionality in this regard. The major aim of the New Neighbourhood Policy can be summarised as developing a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood - a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations.

The EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East envisaged by the European Council decision in December 2003 also aims at furthering Euro-Med Partnership

---


25 For the text of this Common Strategy, see Presidency Conclusions, European Council at Santa Maria da Feira, 19 and 20 June 2000, Annex V. This document can be accessed though: [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1_en0.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1_en0.htm)

through addressing the challenges facing the region within a cooperative framework. The final report on the Strategic Partnership suggests the use of “a wide range of measures, from promoting a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and preventing proliferation to ensuring economic growth and stability, managing and addressing migration issues, ensuring security of energy supply, promoting sustainable development and promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil society and good governance. The Strategic Partnership’s objective is set as the development of a prosperous, secure and vibrant Mediterranean and Middle East.

It is crucial to note that all the documents on the Euro-Med Partnership and the New Neighbourhood policy refer to the conflict in the Middle East and call for measures to upgrade the EU’s role in the resolution of this conflict. A clear link is established between a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in these documents. In the final report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it is stated that the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will remain a core strategic priority and that it will not be possible to realise a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress unless a just and lasting settlement of the conflict is in place.

It is a commonly-agreed fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict feeds into radical Islamist terrorism. It is also due to this fact that in many EU texts the Middle East conflict is mentioned alongside terrorism. For example in a document on the EU Action in Response to 11th September 2001, the Commission contends:

27 For the text of the Final Report on EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, see: http://www.eu-del.org.il/English/specialftr.asp?id=41
28 Ibid.
29 For the text of the Final Report on EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, see: http://www.eu-del.org.il/English/specialftr.asp?id=41.
“The EU was already deeply involved in the search for peace and stability in the Middle East long before the attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001, but those events have undoubtedly thrown into even sharper focus the urgent need to tackle regional problems that can give rise to terrorism. The EU plays a crucial role in preserving the Palestinian Authority as a negotiating partner, by providing substantial financial assistance.”\textsuperscript{30} [Emphasis original]

Similarly, the Mediterranean is also mentioned in the same document. The Commission states:

“The events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} demonstrated the need for political and cultural dialogue with those parts of the world where terrorism comes into being. The EU has supported dialogue to counter racial, religious and cultural prejudice. A \textit{Euro-Mediterranean Foundation} is to be set up under the Barcelona Process. Firm commitments to enhanced inter-cultural dialogue have been made at a meeting of EU Member States, Candidate Countries and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Istanbul on 12 February 2002.”\textsuperscript{31} [Emphasis original]

Even before September 11, terrorism was mentioned as an important problem to be tackled within the cooperative framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. For example in the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, it is provided that cooperation against global challenges to security, such as terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking should be reinforced\textsuperscript{32}. In the more recent documents, however, the impact of September 11 can easily be traced. In the final report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the EU’s overarching objective is set as setting up “appropriate consultation and


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{32} For the text of this Common Strategy, see Presidency Conclusions, European Council at Santa Maria da Feira, 19 and 20 June 2000, Annex V. This document can be accessed though: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm
cooperation mechanisms for enhanced political dialogue on conflict prevention and crisis management, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation.” The means to carry this objective with regard to counter-terrorism forward are stated in the document as the following: Implementation of reinforced operational cooperation in the fight against terrorism among judicial and police authorities; through the Justice and Security sub-committees existing or currently being established under Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and the ENP [European Neighbourhood Policy] Action Plans. Building on existing engagement with the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] including on the question of tackling financing of terrorism and seek other opportunities for technical cooperation.

In the Commission Communication on the New Neighbourhood policy, it is stressed:

“Cross-border cultural links, not least between people of the same ethnic/cultural affinities, gain additional importance in the context of proximity. Equally, threats to mutual security, whether from the trans-border dimension of environmental and nuclear hazards, communicable diseases, illegal immigration, trafficking, organised crime or terrorist networks, will require joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively.”

In the same document, and under the title “Intensified Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Common Security Threats”, it is emphasised that cooperation, joint work and assistance to combat threats such as terrorism and trans-national organised crime, etc. should be prioritized. In the document, it is stated that the fight against terrorism is a potential area for closer cooperation and that the new neighbours should also be assisted in the implementation of all the

33 For the text of the Final Report on EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, see: http://www.eu-del.org.il/English/specialftr.asp?id=41
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
relevant international instruments in this field, notably those developed in the UN\textsuperscript{36}.

A thorough analysis of all the documents referred to above reveals that the Mediterranean is a crucial area of concern in EU’s counter-terrorism efforts. The root causes of terrorism do exist in this region and they need to be tackled immediately and through the use of effective measures. It is due to this fact that the EU has given greater emphasis to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process and also created complementary mechanisms, such as the New Neighbourhood Policy and the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in order to support this process.

**Concluding Remarks**

In foreign policy-making, the EU does not solely rely on the instruments of its CFSP. Rather, it uses a wide-range of instruments which carry a cross-pillar characteristic, in that it may use the instruments of one pillar to deal with the issues that are relevant for another pillar. The special tools that it uses for creating a foreign policy impact and maintaining security (besides its CFSP and ESDP) are *development aid* which involves humanitarian and reconstruction aid; *enlargement*; and *framework instruments* (cooperation, association and partnership agreements). Most of these tools are unique to the EU and even those that are also used by other international actors do not usually engender the same degree of effectiveness.

All these three sets of tools are significant in the sense that they heavily rely on the *conditionality* that the (third) countries in question should respect basic values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law and refrain from supporting terrorism. Considering that the EU is the biggest provider of development aid; holds the highest proportion of world trade, and generates a magnetism (especially the membership prospect) by virtue of the strength of its core, it can be asserted that the Union creates a

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
unique security impact through the use of such tools. The crucial point to keep in mind in this regard is that the EU uses a non-military approach in creating this impact. The use of non-military tools in its foreign policy has led to the Union’s definition as a “civilian power” by many analysts. From the promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries to the international fight against terrorism, the EU’s major strength lies in the civilian emphasis in its foreign policy.

In view of the facts stated above, it can be concluded that the EU is well-placed to deal with terrorism. This is because; through the use of all the available cross-pillar foreign policy instruments, the EU approaches terrorism from all possible dimensions. Furthermore, its commitment to finding the root causes of terrorism and dealing with them through soft-security measures gives it a unique strength in finding long-term solutions to the problem.

The Mediterranean is of great importance in EU’s counter-terrorism efforts since it is one of the major areas in the world which provides a fertile ground on which terrorism can flourish. The most important point to keep in mind, however, is that finding a solution to the issues of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and to terrorism requires political will on the part of the EU Member States. The foreign policy tools available for tackling these problems can only be used effectively and credibly if they are supported by strong political will. Otherwise, all the efforts for achieving peace and stability and fighting terrorism will be doomed to failure.