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European Identity: A study using the method of Identity Structure Analysis in Estonia in 2003-2005

ABSTRACT. The purpose of our article is to represent a general approach to the problems of the real social integration of Estonian society, and to focus on the problem of identity before and after Estonia's integration in the European Union. We understand European identity as a social construct. We examined empirically attitudes of the urban population of Estonia towards accession to the EU. The progression towards a European identity among pro-EU-accession and anti-EU-accession Estonians together with the progression of the very significant Russian minority group was under detailed observation in the analysis. Data were gathered some months before the EU referendum held on 14th of September 2003. New data were gathered during the Estonian-Russian Border Treaty discussion period in May and September 2005.

The most important finding: European enlargement has influenced the self-definition of Estonian people. The transition to EU status will give an opportunity to re-define "Europeanness" from the viewpoint of new European identity components (e.g., the shared sameness of people belonging to the same group, with a common narrative and broadly matching cultural attitudes, beliefs and values) incorporated into Estonian identity.

Introduction: Societal integration as a tool for a new dimension in collective identity in Estonia

Estonian population can be described as relatively diverse by several indicators: by ethnic background (Estonians, Russians and other Slavs, Finns, etc), by language use (mainly Estonian or Russian) and by income differences (*Gini index* ~ 0,363, according to EU-SILC study in 2004 (*Income and Living Conditions 2005*)).

During last fifteen years social diversity between social groups has grown. The social, political, and cultural divergence have made the society more fragmented, introducing more disintegration in society. Even if so, this could be described as setting of new circumstances for the development of democracy, evolving new challenges for social integration of the society to a new orientation. The process of social integration can perhaps be analysed in

terms of redefining a conception of common national identity of Estonian people that includes Estonians and ethnic minorities.

The processes of developing democracy and state structures during the past 15 years have resulted in changed circumstances. We propose that the existence of the newly independent Estonian state will generally diminish the importance of an ethnic dimension in people's self-definition and increase the social-political dimension. This would be manifested by all sections of the community – Estonian ethnic minorities as well as mainstream Estonians - such that a common civic dimension becomes upper-most in people's national identity reconstructions.

However, the Estonian population cannot be treated simply as a carrier of a single new ethnic and national identity. A problem might arise with those social factors and mechanisms that should assist the processes of cultural integration (in terms of the formation of a multi-cultural society) and national integration (in the terms of Estonian citizenship) into an overall as a societal integration, but which may be undermined by other factors.

In the sociological literature, societal integration is predominantly considered to be the best developmental model for societies in central and eastern European countries (and in Estonia). As suggested, for example, in the general conceptions by Münch (1998) and Beck/Grande (2004), and in the special analysis for Estonia by Löfgren and Herd (2000) and Lauristin and others (2004).

We conceive successful integration to be a process of societal co-operation aimed at forging a new community of people that shares a super-ordinate, qualitatively distinctive orientation. For Estonian society it is important in this context to distinguish integration from assimilation and segregation of ethnic minorities since, on the one hand, it is important for the Russian minority to maintain its original cultural heritage, and, on the other hand, it is important that minorities will be able to prosper in their double cultural circumstances. While it is one thing to express support for the idea of integration, it is quite another matter to ensure its realisation.

The differentiation between many levels and segments of integration means that the process of forming new well-functioning structures in the society is much more complicated than just the basic understanding of integration, which focuses only on the two different language groups: Estonians and Russians. It is possible to define the current situation as the realisation

of the first stage of the societal integration process – namely, the acknowledgement of common social problems instead of specific inter-ethnic problems, and the enhancement of tolerance between the Estonians and Russian-speaking population. Estonia is entering into the next stage in the societal integration process, which should entail the efficient co-operation between Estonians and non-Estonian ethnic groups in the context of the European Union. As a consequence of this analysis, we can examine societal integration in Estonia as a tool for European dimension of collective identity.

Identity structure analysis in the EU Referendum process

We understand European identity as a social construct – the shared sameness of people belonging to the same group, with a common narrative and broadly matching attitudes, beliefs and values. The formation of the new European identity in Estonia – related to the process of accession to the European Union - as an incorporation of a new dimension in collective identity, started at the beginning of the 90-ies (*Kirch and Kirch 2001: 130*).


The European identity is a notion, which is rooted into the EU applicant countries' social discourses. The European past contains complex paradigms, which complexity could itself be presented as a common European cultural background. Western ideas of personal values, liberalism, rule of (written) law, principles of human rights and human equality are good examples. Having in minds these more or less largely shared ideas and paradigms, one can define the historical and cultural closeness to Europe as the affinities of people sharing common experiences of European history, even when this has involved antagonistic relationship and war.

European integration is first and foremost the formation of political institutions with their normative and political identity, and the formation of a common market. Although, cultural communication and education could in their turn promote the identification with, and the unification of, European political space, as expressed by Michel Foucher (*Foucher 1998/2000*). Communication at the local level can encourage the consolidation of the collective dimension, while leaving the national communication space at large untouched. At the same time, leaving the question about political space open, national culture and history provide justification for a common orientation to Europe.

When Estonian society was facing the EU-referendum in September 2003, the share of those who voted in favour of the European Union was 66.8 per cent, while the percentage of those who voted against the membership was 33.2. The overall participation rate in Estonia was 64.1 % (*Estonian National Electoral Committee, 2003*). Public support for the European Union in Estonia increased from 48% in 2003 (people who answered “definitely support” and “rather support”) to 68% in September 2005. The proportion of opponents to the EU clearly diminished: from 44% in June 2003 to 26% in 2005 (*EMOR, EL Seire*).

During the debate, which took place in the first year after Estonia joined the EU, the majority of citizens realised that EU membership provided new possibilities for defining the country’s position on Europe’s political and cultural map. *Eurobarometer* Studies data shows a clear willingness with regards to the EU in Estonia. *Eurobarometer* Studies 62 and 63 reported that the proportion of Estonian people who answered that “EU is a good thing” had grown as in Estonia and its neighbouring countries in (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). In March 2004 this was 31%, in - October-November 2004 - 52%, but in October-November 2005 – 41% (according *Eurobarometer* Study 64 as see on Figure 1).

Fig. 1. EU *Eurobarometer* Study “EU is a good thing”



* *Eurobarometer* Studies 62, 63, 63 and 64

Identity is about the feeling of being a member of a political or cultural community as summarized by Martin Kohli on ground of *Eurobarometer* (Kohli 2000: 122) and positive answers to question “EU is a good thing” were good indicator about European Union feeling.

Although being indisputably a part of Europe, Estonia's position there has not been always conclusively defined. Today, ideas about identifying with Estonian welfare neighbours (referring to similarities with Nordic countries) are spreading. One of these tendencies is that Estonian regional identity within the European Union could become similar to that of the Nordic countries (Finland and others). On the other hand, Estonian identity has some specific features, which allude to the possibility of belonging to the group of Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Furthermore, according to some popular formulations of certain politicians, Estonia tends to be more similar to Ireland and United Kingdom.

Facing the EU-accession, according to our earlier study from 2000 (Kirch, Rull, Tuisk, 2001: 328-330) significant others such as Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics, rather than the Estonian Government, and the Estonian cultural elite or business circles, were predominant entities in the expression of identity in our target groups. The question was whether these entities remained “significant others” in 2003 and 2005?


The authors used the Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) conceptual framework to investigate these issues. The method was developed by Peter Weinreich in order to study the structure of personal and collective identity changes (Weinreich, 1989; Weinreich & Saunderson, 2003). The data were gathered in the following Estonian cities: Tallinn, Tartu, Viljandi and Narva (N=174 persons) before the accession of Estonia to the European Union in April-June 2003. Further data were gathered during the referendums on European Union Constitutional Treaty in European states and the contract establishing the Estonian-Russian Border Treaty in May and September 2005 (N= 74 persons). The data were gathered in two universities of Tallinn.

The study's identity instrument consisted of 13 bipolar constructs and 11 entities (in 2005 – 10 bipolar constructs - Appendix 1). The constructs reflected personal attitudes towards different economic strategies, the free movement of people, the role of EU-legislation in comparison with national legislation, minority rights protection, etc. The individual psychological level reflects some social tensions and conflicts that sometimes get anchored to EU-accession issues. Respondents were able to construe themselves (their self-images) in

different contexts, and appraise significant others and groups in terms of the characteristics expressed by way of each particular bipolar construct, one at a time, on a 9-point scale. The eleven entities included “Me as I would like to be” (ideal self), “Me as I am now” (current self 1), “Me in 2003, Year of EU-referendum” (past self), “Person whom I honour and admire” (admired person), and “Person whom I don’t like at all” (disliked person) as mandatory entities required by the ISA method. “Me when representing Estonia at EU negotiations in Brussels” (current self 2), allowed respondents to appraise themselves in imagination as an agent directly involved with EU matters. Further entities included - “Estonia’s business circles,” “Estonia’s cultural elite,” “Euro-optimists in Estonia,” “Estonian Government,” and “Euro-sceptics in Estonia”. These represented significant others and agents in Estonian society.

The indices *idealistic identification* and *ego-involvement* were computed using the Identity Exploration (IDEX) computer software. The definition of *idealistic identification* is as follows: the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those one would like to possess as part of one’s ideal self-image. The *idealistic identification index* has a parameter range between 0 and 1. Magnitudes are considered high when above 0.70 and low when below 0.50. In 2003 entities or significant others towards whom the Estonian “yes to EU” group aspire are: “Estonian Government” and “Estonian business circles” as well as “Euro-optimists” (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Idealistic identification with *significant others* by Estonians and Russians in 2003 (before EU-referendum)




The Russian pro-accession group aspire towards the entities “Estonian business circles,” and “Estonian cultural elite” (having one of the highest values) and also “Euro-optimists”. These findings also show that the Estonian accession supporters seem to be hesitant to identify in aspirational manner with the cultural elite, as concern about preservation of Estonian culture and language after accession had been mostly expressed by intellectuals and people engaged in the sphere of culture. At the same time the Russian pro-accession respondents’ index magnitude is 0.66, showing that their identification with the Estonian cultural elite is stronger than that of Russians “against the EU”, and even higher than among Estonians themselves. The latter finding is probably based on these Russians’ broader perception that culture is not subject to change when a nation joins the EU.

For Estonia’s pro-accession Russians, therefore, the EU is more of a political project than it is for Estonians. The Russians’ lower idealistic identification with the Estonian government can be explained by the fact that it represents an authority associated with strict demands concerning the Estonian language, law and citizenship policy (although during the last decade several of these requirements in respective legal acts have been loosened).

Comparison of study results from years 2003 and 2005 broadly refer to the growing positive trend of identification with EU dimensions – people see among positive “important others” people and institutions related to EU.

Fig. 3. Estonians' idealistic identification with others in 2003 and 2005




Concerning the results from the latest study we can say that people who in general support Estonia’s belonging to the EU identify largely with the Estonian Government, more than with local business circles or with the cultural elite. During the EU referendum debate in 2003 it was rather different – people who were critical of the Estonian Government also tended to be

critical of the EU accession decision. All people, despite their different views on Estonia's role in the EU integration process, strongly identified with the entity 'representing Estonia at EU negotiations in Brussels'. Even those who reported they were against the accession identify more with the Estonian Government and the cultural elite. These findings show that, instead of direct identification with European optimists or pessimists, respondents in their aspirations identify more with the state institutions and significant social groups ("the Government", business circles, the cultural elite) that are real actors in EU integration process. Magnitudes of the index increased for both groups – those who are pro- and to a greater degree those who are against integration – indicating that acceptance of EU ideas increased during this short period between two studies, especially noticeable for those 'against'.

Ego-involvement – shows how important is some entity to the respondent. *Ego-involvement* index (computed using the IDEX software) makes it possible to estimate the relative impact of others in the development of one's own identity. The index has a parameter range between 0 and 5, and the magnitudes are considered high when above 4 and low when below 2. After the EU referendum (2005) a slight increase with Euro-sceptics was visible among young people and also with Euro-optimists, which suggest a slightly greater involvement with Europe-based issues in general [Change is demonstrated in Fig 4].

Fig. 4. Ego-Involvement among Estonians in 2003-2005



According to assessments of *ego-involvement* in 2005, respondents' attitudes towards EU are most exercised by debate between European-sceptics and European-optimists. Respondents'

high ego-involvement with Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics demonstrates the significance of a democratic political environment and openness in Estonia as both of these entities represent alternative perspectives. This balanced situation should benefit the orientation of today's changing society. But may we conclude that due to the Estonia's EU membership, a European dimension is becoming part of Estonians' self-perception?

ISA offers a means of quantitatively representing informal ideologies, in terms of the *structural pressure on constructs*. Structural pressure refers to the consistency with which a particular construct is used in the appraisal of self and others. This consistency derives from the compatibility of the construct's evaluative connotations with one's overall evaluation of the entities to which it is attributed (Weinreich, 1980/1986; Weinreich & Saunderson, 2003). High structural pressure on a construct means that it is used consistently to evaluate self and others, thus representing a core value for the individual/group in question. Other constructs may form secondary, inconsistent or unevaluative dimensions of identity, depending on the degree of structural pressure with which they are applied to self and others. An examination of the core constructs for those who are for EU-Accession (Table 1) and those who are against/uncertain about the accession (Table 2) reveals salient differences in informal ideology between the two groups. As expected from their attitudes different values are considered as important for these two groups we have under investigation.

Table 1. Structural pressure on constructs among respondents' groups who were in favour of Estonia's EU-Accession (questioned in May and in September 2005)

In May 2005, for EU-Accession, n=19			In Sept 2005, for EU-Accession n=21		
No	Construct	Structural Pressure	No	Construct	Structural Pressure
6	In the EU protection of the human rights is guaranteed well enough	72.70***	6	In the EU protection of the human rights is guaranteed well enough	60.73**
5	Free movement of employees between the member states gives better job opportunities for people	71.89***	5	Free movement of employees between the member states gives better job opportunities for people	52.54**
4	The EU is capable of guaranteeing, peace, stable development and security	69.35**	4	The EU is capable of guaranteeing, peace, stable development and security	58.59*
10	Border treaty with Russia should be signed, this grants sovereignty and security	68.98**	10	Border treaty with Russia should be signed, this grants sovereignty and security	43.08
3	The EU remains capability to develop and reform	63.15**	3	The EU remains capability to develop and reform	62.39**
7	EU membership promotes and encourages the development of Estonian language and culture	56.96*	7	EU membership promotes and encourages the development of Estonian language and culture	44.77

Note: Structural pressure is scaled from -100 to 100. 'Core' evaluative dimensions are ***70–79; **60–69; *50–59.

From the Table 1 we can see that for EU optimists the constructs about EU protection of human rights (6), free movement of labour favouring job opportunities (5) and EU guaranteeing peace and stability (4) play a large role by expressing their belief in "overall features" of the EU. At the same time constructs relating to the EU reforming its bureaucracy (3) and Estonian-Russian border treaty (10) follow those three constructs mentioned above. From May to September all values have dropped, and the sequence of those top constructs has changed. The most persistent construct over the summer was 'EU reforming its bureaucracy' (3). Although the value decreased from 63.2 to 62.4, this index became the strongest among other 'core' constructs followed by "the EU granting human rights" (6). These changes show constant belief of pro-EU respondents into the EU's development and capability to reform itself also in the future.

For EU-optimists the treaty as such grants sovereignty while EU-sceptics are afraid of Estonia's losing sovereignty. But for September 2005 the Border Treaty had lost its importance, the value had dropped even more dramatically among pro-accession group of the respondents (from 68.9 to 43.1).

When comparing Tables 1 and 2, we can see that for the optimists the construct 5 (free movement of employees between the member states) is the one that can be taken as a 'core' construct. For the sceptics "several problems arise in Estonia due free movement of labour force" has the highest structural pressure (their value has increased from 50.5 to 75.4). Hard to believe, but this change can be explained by level of wellbeing among the respective groups of youth.

Those (EU-sceptics), who have met difficulties at the labour market, have become sceptical about their own perspectives and they do not support all-European competition. At the same time the EU-optimists, who support free labour market, use this as an opportunity to develop their own perspectives by working in another country, especially in "old member states" where salaries are higher compared to Estonia. Changes of the structural pressure values also reflect that personal issues (me and me at the labour market) have become to emerge while the border treaty as one of the larger political issues remain somewhere far away on the horizon for each respondent as individual. Also increase of structural pressure about the EU as supranational body retarding local decision-making (construct 9, from 53.8 to 67.2) among EU-sceptics is a sign of disappointment about processes taken place from May to September in 2005 (Table 2).

Table 2. Structural pressure on constructs among respondents who are against or uncertain about EU-accession in May and September 2005

May 2005, n=16			Sept 2005, n=26		
No	Construct	Structural Pressure	No	Construct	Structural Pressure
3	The EU is under way to a bureaucratic organisation, Unable to reform oneself	57.32*	3	The EU is under way to a bureaucratic organisation, unable to reform oneself	58.00*
10	The Estonia-Russia border treaty should not be undersigned, this is going weaken Estonia's sovereignty	56.81*	10	The Estonia-Russia border treaty should not be undersigned, this is going weaken Estonia's sovereignty	47.72
9	The EU is a supranational formation that in a certain degree restricts decision-making and independence of the states themselves	53.78*	9	The EU is a supranational formation that in a certain degree restricts decision-making and independence of the states themselves	67.20**
2	New member states cause extensive changes in EU policies (for example in agriculture)	51.91*	2	New member states cause extensive changes in EU policies (for example in agriculture)	45.86
5	Several problems arise in Estonia due free movement of labour force	50.51*	5	Several problems arise in Estonia due free movement of labour force	75.37***
6	Protection of minority rights in the EU turned into an empty cliché	44.76	6	Protection of minority rights in the EU turned into an empty cliché	55.61*
8	Most important are the aims of the EU as a supranational body	40.02	8	Most important are the aims of the EU as a supranational body	52.52*

Note: Structural pressure is scaled from -100 to 100. 'Core' evaluative dimensions are ***70–79; **60–69; *50–59.

According to our analysis, high structural pressure on a construct *of free movement of employees between the member states* means that it is used consistently to evaluate self and others. In their everyday life people evaluate more and more modern arrangements and post-industrial values, which have created certain contradiction between their identity structure archetypes and these new values. The new opportunities create the ground for the reception of the new set of values. According to our analysis, we can conclude, that the Estonian society (as others among the Nordic and Baltic countries) have reached the phase, where increasing international communication, economic and cultural ties and the legal-administrative pressure from the EU side, have initiated a strong shift towards the creation of new “borderless” identity.

The identity structure analysis data (from 1993-1995 and 2002-2003) demonstrate common trends in the changes of the identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians (*Kirch and Kirch 2004: 42-43*). The status of European citizen should ease the redefinition of identity for Estonian Russians and other minority ethnic groups, which is likely to be influenced by

European values. However, one cultural environment will probably not be replaced by another, but instead by a significantly wider cultural space.

The final questions are: will young Russian-speakers turn into a multicultural population group? Will the national (state-determined) identity become of significant value for them? Sergei Issakov (University of Tartu) has expressed the opinion that Estonia is already half way towards significant integration. According to his views, an interesting process in the formation of a new ethnic group and a new ethno-cultural community – Estonian Russians – is evidently underway. This is a group with its own subculture, in some aspects similar to the French-speaking population in Canada, or Swedish-speaking Finns (*Issakov, 2004*).


For Russians in Estonia integration is a continuous process, in which step by step they become closer to Estonian society without simultaneously losing their Russian cultural heritage (e.g. Russian language). For many people, however, language barriers still exist. Most Estonians (68 percent) have a good knowledge of Russian (*Census 2000: 10*) but only 40 percent of Russians (having Estonian citizenship) have a good knowledge of Estonian. Only 5 percent Russians with citizenship of the Russian Federation or individuals of undetermined citizenship are able to communicate in the local language (*Integratsiooni monitoring 2005: 32*).

Estonian ethnic identity is perceived as being endangered mostly by imminent globalisation or trends of de-population. Estonia's hopes for security guarantees related to accession to the EU and NATO were undoubtedly clearly defined. If we could relate a process of national identification with practical security matters then readiness to defend the homeland (Estonia) would be one of the national loyalty indicators. According to study results of the Research Centre *Faktum* (May 2005) most Estonian people are ready to defend the country should there be any kind of need for real defence actions. More precisely: 74% of Estonians, 62% of non-Estonians who are Estonian citizens, and 58% of non-citizens are ready to participate in defence actions.

Estonian Russians attitudes towards NATO membership have been rather different. In 2000 57 percent of Estonians and only 25 percent of Russians supported Estonia's joining with NATO. However, positive attitudes of local Russians towards Estonia's NATO membership

have grown and in May (2005) 88 percent of Estonians and 42 percent of Russians supported NATO as one can see from Figure 5.

Fig. 5 Support to Estonian NATO membership*



* Results of the Research Centre *Faktum* (May 2005)

As a consequence of this result, the new international context gave new opportunities for local ethno-national integration so that securing the continuation of Estonia's internal and national integration might be not problematic. Estonians see military security as a guarantee for the protection of national independence, which is also the precondition for national identity security. At the same time, a process of 'ethnic demobilisation', or diminution of ethnic politicisation, appears to prevail. Ethnic demobilisation encourages the political and economic unity of the country, the feeling of sameness with Europe and NATO. For Estonian Russians, therefore, we see here again that EU is more of a political project than it is for Estonians.

Conclusions

European identity is a notion, which has earlier roots in the EU countries' social discourses. The formation of the new European identity in Estonia – related to the process of accession

to the European Union - as an incorporation of a further dimension of collective identity, started at the beginning of the 90-ies.

European enlargement has influenced the self-definition of Estonian people. The transition to EU status will give an opportunity to re-define "Europeanness" from the viewpoint of new European identity components (e.g., the shared sameness of people belonging to the same group, with a common narrative and broadly matching cultural attitudes, beliefs and values) incorporated into Estonian identity.

The identity structure analysis data (from 1993-1995 and 2000-2005 based on Weinreich's Identity Structure Analysis) demonstrate common trends in the changes of the identity of Estonian people. Comparison of study results from years 2003 and 2005 broadly refer to the growing positive trend of identification with EU dimensions – respondents see among positive "significant others" people and institutions related to the EU. Concerning the results from the latest study (see Fig 3) we can say that people who in general support Estonia's belonging to the EU identify themselves largely with the Estonian Government, more than with local business circles or with the cultural elite.

According to our analysis, efficient co-operation between Estonians and Russians as a national minority in the context of the European Union could be more productive within the framework of common international institutions in the broader European context. The new international context gave new opportunities for local ethno-national integration so that securing the continuation of Estonia's internal and national integration might be not problematic.

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Appendix 1 Questionnaire of the study (2005)

Each page of the questionnaire had one of the 10 bipolar constructs in the top. The entities on the left side expressed facets of respondent's world-picture. He/she had to cross one position for each entity of the scale (see the example below)

	1L				1R				
Me as I am now		-	-	-	0	-	-	X	-
Estonia's business circles		-	-	X	-	0	-	-	-
Person who I honour and admire		-	-	-	0	-	X	-	-
Me in 2003 (year of EU-referendum)		-	-	-	0	X	-	-	-
Estonia's cultural elite		-	X	-	-	0	-	-	-
Euro-optimists in Estonia		-	-	X	-	0	-	-	-
Me as I would like to be		-	-	-	0	-	-	X	-
Estonia's Government		-	-	-	0	-	-	X	-
Me when representing the state in Brussels		-	-	-	X	0	-	-	-
Euro-sceptics in Estonia		-	-	-	0	-	-	-	X
Person whom I don't like at all		-	-	-	X	0	-	-	-

The constructs. The following constructs were used at the top of each page while list of the entities remained unchanged throughout the instrument.

1L EU laws are liberal enough in regulating market economy	1R EU laws are too tough for liberal economy
2L New member states cause extensive changes in EU policies (especially in agriculture)	2R New member states adapt existing system, and EU policies do not change very much as a consequence
3L The EU is under way to a bureaucratic organisation, unable to reform oneself	3R The EU remains ability to develop and reform
4L The EU is capable of guaranteeing peace, stable development, and security	4R The EU is not able to cope with conflicts and guarantee security in every member state
5L Free movement of employees between the member states gives better job opportunities for people	5R Common labour market causes many problems due to migrants
6L In the EU protection of human rights is guaranteed well enough	6R Protection of human rights in the EU has turned into an empty cliché
7L EU-accession endangers the development of Estonian language and culture	7R EU membership promotes and encourages the development of Estonian language and culture
8L Most important are the liberties and welfare of EU citizens	8R Most important are the aims of the EU as a supranational body
9L The EU is a supranational formation that in a certain degree restricts decision-making and independence of the states themselves	9R The EU is a voluntary union, originating on common decision-making and rights delegated to the Union
10L The Estonia-Russia border treaty should not be undersigned, this is going weaken Estonia's sovereignty	10 R Border treaty with Russia should be signed, this grants sovereignty and security